Abstract: Even though fiscal sovereignty still counts as a fundamental principle of government, global and regional economic integration as well as increasing levels of sovereign debt severely limit governments' tax policy choices. In particular the redistributive function of taxation has suffered in the pursuit of economic competitiveness. As inequality rises and attention is directed again at taxation as a means for redistribution, international cooperation appears as an avenue to enable redistribution through taxation. Yet, one of the predominant international institutions dealing with tax matters -the OECD -with its focus on economic growth and competitiveness and resulting tax policy advice prevents rather than promotes national and international debates on taxation as a question of social justice. The paper argues that questions of taxation need to be perceived as questions of social justice and thus as questions of politics, and not merely of economics. Only if taxation is not considered a mere economic instrument can a 'political economy' be maintained. The paper addresses the three objectives of taxation -revenue generation, redistribution and regulation --and how they are affected as governments aim for fiscal consolidation to conclude that governments' power to freely pursue and calibrate these objectives has come to appear rather as a myth than the core of sovereignty. It then demonstrates how the OECD's tax policy advice and cooperation in tax matters react to the constraints on governmental taxation powers; how they aim at economic growth and competitiveness to the detriment of (other) ideas of social justice. The paper concludes with a call for (re)integrating social and global justice concerns into debates on taxation. .
freedom has been shrinking, the area of taxation being one where governments' power to intervene in order to address the social costs of economic globalisation and to realise a society's own vision of social justice appears restricted by the threat of loss of competitiveness in the global economy.
11 One reaction to the diminishing 'policy space' of governments takes the form of restrictions on transnational economic activity to restore domestic policy space, another is the turn to international institutions and intergovernmental cooperation in order to integrate or balance economic integration with other societal concerns at the international level. See, supra, note 3. 10 Ibid. In the realm of taxation the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) appears to be the most important international institution to tackle the effects of globalization: first through the generation of policy advice and, second, through intergovernmental cooperation on tax matters. Yet, in neither of these two fields of activity the organisation has served to save the idea of embedded liberalism. From the policy advice given by the OECD Secretariat on tax matters, it is clear that the organisation has fully embraced the rationality of global economic integration. In the OECD debates among government representatives on international cooperation in the face of increasing competition between different tax systems, concerns about policy space for the pursuit of societal ideas of (redistributive) justice figure more prominently than in the policy papers of the OECD Secretariat. Here too, however, the dominant language is economic: cooperation aims to ensure 'good competition' and combat 'bad (or harmful) competition'. These debates largely sideline the question of how ideas of social justice may be realised through political action at the national level -in this case taxation. Moreover, they hardly address questions of global justice that are equally implicated in the developments that the OECD denotes as harmful tax competition, including the question of how to react to the observation that tax evasion and avoidance hit developing countries much harder than developed countries.
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This chapter puts forward the argument that questions of social and global justice are being excluded from the policy advice given by the OECD on taxation as well as from the international cooperation against harmful tax competition as conducted within the framework of the OECD. It calls for acknowledging that decisions about tax policy are expressive of ideas about justice and -more specifically -the distribution of the costs and benefits of economic activity within society and across societies. Before I turn to the OECD, section B addresses in more detail how the three objectives of taxation -revenue generation, redistribution and regulation -are affected as governments aim for fiscal consolidation and how government's power to freely pursue and calibrate these objectives has come to appear rather as a myth than the core of sovereignty. Section C demonstrates how the OECD's tax policy advice and cooperation in tax matters react to the constraints on governmental taxation powers; how they aim at economic growth and competitiveness to the detriment of (other) ideas of social justice. The paper concludes in section D with a call for (re)integrating social and global justice concerns into debates on taxation.
B.

Government objectives of taxation and the myth of fiscal sovereignty
Taxation not only serves to generate revenue, it is also an instrument used in the welfare state to redistribute and to steer the behaviour of economic actors.
In times of austerity, the focus is on taxation as much as a means to reduce government debt as it is on taxation as a way to distribute the burdens of fiscal consolidation, and as a potentially cost-efficient way to regulate. Yet, while governments cling to the power of taxation as a core power of government, fiscal sovereignty in times of regional and global economic integration appears increasingly to be a myth.
I. Revenue generation
In market economies, governments rely on three main sources for government revenue: charges, taxes and debt instruments, such as government bonds.
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When governments aim at fiscal consolidation, tax revenue is essential to reduce budget deficits and public debt. Consolidation may follow the recognition that further borrowing to finance the deficit destabilises the economy. 16 It, may, however, also be required by law. 
II. Redistribution
In the modern welfare states, taxes have always been aimed at redistribution.
Apart from revenue generation for the provision of public goods and to cover the costs of war, governments collected taxes to address the increasing inequalities emerging from industrialisation. When income taxes were introduced on a comprehensive basis the redistributive objective was maintained and realised mainly through progressivity. 25 The guiding principle for taxation has long been the 'ability to pay principle' which aims at horizontal equity (persons with equal 21 One way suggested to increase revenue without increasing taxes is the reduction of tax expenditures; incomes should pay equal taxes) and vertical equity (persons with higher incomes should pay higher taxes). 26 While, until the 1970s, assessment of tax policy was predominantly conducted on the basis of equity considerations a shift occurred in the 1970s and 1980s
when tax policy was increasingly tested for its efficiency. Efficiency analysis led both to a questioning of the effectiveness of income taxes as means for distribution (as income tax progressivity may pose a disincentive to work) and of the desirability of redistribution. 27 This change in assessment of tax policy went hand in hand with the increasing mobility of capital. As a result investors can easily move capital to other jurisdictions in order to minimise the tax incurred on capital income.
As a result many tax systems were changed by cutting income tax rates whilst broadening the tax base, by reducing the progressivity of income taxation and through the adoption of general consumption taxes, 28 which tend to be regressive as the poorer segments of the population spend a higher proportion of their income on consumption than the wealthier ones do. 29 While the shares of corporate and personal income taxes of the overall tax revenue appear to have remained relatively stable, tax scholars have shown that the tax burden has shifted away from capital to (less mobile) labour.
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That tax progressivity has waned and the tax burden been shifted onto labour is partly responsible for the growing inequality in many societies. While poverty has been decreasing overall, the income gap (after tax and benefits) between the small segments of society that are extremely rich and the rest of the population has been expanding in many countries. 31 The gap between the extremely wealthy and the rest of society is not only criticised from the 26 Ibid., 209 et seq. On the two main approaches to tax equity, the 'benefit principle' and the 'ability to pay principle', see R.A. standpoint of social justice; increasingly researchers are pointing out the detrimental effects of inequality on well-being. 32 Economists have come to the conclusion that inequality may in fact be destabilising and endanger economic growth. 33 This research is of particular relevance in a context of austerity, as the financial and debt crises pose the danger of increasing inequality even further.
Poor countries at the periphery of the global economy have suffered disproportionately more than wealthy countries, and within the wealthier societies it is the poor and middle-income segments that bear the brunt of the burden of government bail-outs and austerity programmes. 34 As a consequence, the theme of inequality forcefully reemerges in debates on tax policy 35 and has prompted the following proposals by intellectuals, politicians and civil society organisations: First costs to public finances associated with the financial industry shall be internalized, e.g. through financial transaction taxes.
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Secondly, inequality shall be addressed through redistributive taxes on wealth and high incomes. 37 Thirdly, tax evasion and tax avoidance shall be tackled more forcefully. The latter is also considered an equality issue since the opportunities for tax evasion and avoidance grow with income. 38 
III. Regulation
Taxes -if assessed in terms of economic efficiency -constitute costs that influence economic behaviour. Due to their steering effect taxes are frequently used to regulate by deterring or incentivising certain behaviour. In the course of the financial crisis a number of tax policy proposals have aimed at incentivising behaviour that stabilises the economy and at dis-incentivising potentially destabilising economic activities. Thus, for example, it has been suggested to remedy the preferential tax treatment of debt as compared to equity financing, to tax bonuses and to introduce financial transaction taxes.
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IV. The myth of fiscal sovereignty
Who decides about the structure of taxation (the proportion of income taxes, property taxes and consumption taxes, the degree of progressivity) or the level of taxation (the tax rates)? The formal legal answer is: the government, subject to domestic constitutional law, EU law (if the state is an EU member) and international law. Taxation is usually seen as one of the last vestiges of national
sovereignty. For example, the German federal constitutional court, in its 2009
Lisbon judgment on European integration, stated that the power to tax was -as a core government function -part of Germany's constitutional identity and could not be transferred to the European Union. 40 According to this understanding, the power to tax is an essential characteristic of statehood which cannot be relinquished.
In the course of global and regional economic integration the ability of governments to tax has, however, been severely limited. Limitations are due to international and regional law that directly or indirectly restrict the power to tax as well as the liberalisation of capital which is as much a consequence of distribution -crucial to taxation as a governmental power -are largely lost in translation when dealt with at the OECD. While the OECD formally acknowledges national fiscal sovereignty, through its policy advice it provides its members with guidelines for the establishment of tax systems that centre around economic growth and efficiency. Instead of aiming at regaining policy space for redistributive tax policies through international cooperation, the OECD seems to fully embrace the integration of the global economy that has led to the erosion of embedded liberalism.
C. OECD tax policy advice and cooperation
The OECD is the most active international institution in the field of taxation. 60 Ibid., 9-10 (emphasis added). 61 Corrective taxes constitute an exception as the report states that environmental taxes may promote 'Green Growth' (ibid., at 104); on the OECD's view of corrective taxes see section C.I.3. below. 62 Ibid., at 20. 63 Ibid., at 20, 21.
On the basis of this ranking the study makes the following recommendations:
tax reform should 'shift the burden of taxation from income to consumption and/or residence property' and 'improve the design of a tax regime by broadening the tax base and lowering the rate and for improving its externality correcting properties.' 64 The study sees its recommendations partly reflected in recent trends in OECD members' tax structures. Many have already cut personal and corporate income taxes, broadened the tax base and increased the use of the Value Added Tax as a general consumption tax. 65 The study recognises that these changes are partly induced by the mobility of capital. 66 This mobility affords corporations (and individuals) more freedom in their location decisions which, in turn, are becoming more sensitive to tax policies. 67 As a consequence 'countries increasingly use their tax systems to improve their ability to compete in global markets.' 68 The study stresses that tax reforms need to be based on solid policy analysis.
To assess the revenue and welfare impact of taxation, its authors express a preference for behavioural tax policy models. 69 The study supports its own findings with the potential behavioural consequences of certain tax structures.
With respect to top marginal statutory rates on personal income, for example, it argues that their reduction would encourage individual risk-taking and entrepreneurship. 70 By contrast, high progressivity of income taxation will, according to the study, negatively affect the hours worked and productivity (output per hour worked). 71 The study acknowledges that -if implemented -the proposed reforms would lead to less progressivity (and even regressivity) within tax systems and thus may raise distributional concerns. 72 It presents the potential impact of the proposed reforms on the redistributive function of taxation as a trade-off between GDP growth and equity, which is up to the individual OECD countries to evaluate. 73 It leaves no doubt, however, about the authors' preference for the first and attempts to address equity concerns by making the argument that eventually the proposed reforms will increase societal welfare. In a number of places, moreover, the study points out that the trade-off between equity and efficiency might appear to be non-existent. 74 Where equity concerns persist, policy-makers could respond with the compensation of 'reform losers', preferably, however, through direct transfers rather than through changes to the proposed tax structure.
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The interpretation according to which the study does not take equity or social justice seriously as a challenge to the desirability of the implementation of its policy recommendation is further illustrated by the fact that it treats equity concerns in a chapter on 'Strategies for Successfully Implementing Growthoriented Tax Reforms' as potential obstacles to the implementation of the proposed tax reforms. 76 Generally, the authors of the study regard growthoriented tax reforms as a necessity in times of increasing sovereign debt to which they see no alternative. 
Cost-efficient regulation through taxation
The same OECD study includes a recommendation for governments to use taxation in a regulatory mode. More specifically, governments shall 'improve the extent to which taxes correct for externalities.' Where taxes are used as corrective taxes they justify, according to the OECD, a departure from the general guiding principle of a broad tax base and low tax rates.
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The rationale for the endorsement of corrective taxes is similar to the justification of the other tax recommendations listed above. Corrective taxation is held not only to be less distortive of economic behaviour than other types of taxation, such as income taxes, and less distortive than command-and-control regulation, but it is also said to be able to promote growth by offering incentives 73 Ibid., at 22. 74 Residence property taxes, for example, which are frequently regarded as inequitable, according to the OECD, can be justified on the basis of the benefit principle (ibid., at 52). 75 Ibid., at 79. 76 Ibid., at 47 et seq. 77 Ibid., at 102. 78 Ibid., at 10.
for economic activity. Moreover, corrective taxation is held to be preferable to regulation due to its cost-effectiveness: it regulates and raises revenue at the same time. 79 Consequently, the OECD endorses the taxation of environmental The OECD's policy advice thus stands in stark contrast to the concept of embedded liberalism. Instead of testing and delineating the policy space for governments to pursue redistributive policies domestically (or by means of transnational collaboration), it embraces the desirability of policy convergence directed towards the overarching aims of growth, efficiency and competitiveness, which are portrayed as self-explanatory. 87 See ibid., at 49: 'Distributional Considerations might become an obstacle to implementation [of the proposed reforms].' The study goes on to suggest other measures to address inequality: 'The question, of course, arises as to which degree governments would want to use the tax system to redistribute income. Non-tax policy measures that stimulate education, for instance, increase individuals' earning capacity and may therefore contribute to a more equal income distribution' (ibid.). have attempted to attract capital through their tax laws. As a result the tax burden was shifted from labour to capital, and progressivity in taxation decreased. Apart from the convergence of tax systems, countries have adopted preferential tax schemes which grant benefits to multinational enterpriseseither to keep them from shifting residence to another jurisdiction or to induce them to locate production facilities in their jurisdiction. 95 
D.
Conclusion: Taking the justice dimension of taxation seriously
I. Competing ideas of social justice
Critiques abound with regard to the mantra of economic growth in terms of GDP as the all-purpose measure of social progress and well-being. 114 So far, however, alternative visions of a successful society have not really entered into the mainstream analysis of economic policy as conducted at the OECD. Instead economic growth, to be pursued through economic competition, remains the yardstick against which economic policy is measured. Despite the many disappointments of economic globalisation, including increasing inequality and environmental degradation, the hopes for social progress remain confined, it seems, to the realm of private economic freedom.
The role of government is not diminished within this conception of social progress, but it is different from the role of governments within embedded liberalism. As government provides the infrastructure for economic activities and ensures 'fair competition' through regulation, it becomes a facilitator of the economy. Taxation is still necessary to provide revenue to pay for regulatory capitalism. 115 It ceases, however, to be considered as an important instrument for redistribution for fear of the distortive effects such market governance would have on competition and economic output.
To perceive economic liberty and free competition as the main (and only) aims of societal ordering represents one vision of a 'good or just society', which may have its advantages and which finds support in political and economic theory. 116 It is important, however, to recognise it as such -as only a contingent concept of social order and the role of government that is not without alternative.
Whether to choose this concept or another cannot be a question of economic analysis, but falls within the ambit of political processes, be they domestic, regional or global.
II. Politics and uncertainty
To recognise that decisions about taxation imply political choices among competing visions of social justice also entails embracing the fact of indeterminacy and uncertainty. Economists may, using certain models, predict the effect of certain tax measures on certain economic variables on the basis of certain assumptions. How tax policies work in reality, however, is a different matter 117 and it would be fallacious to assume that the answer could be predicted with certainty. The adoption of one economic policy or another ultimately is a political decision between two options both of which hold uncertain futures. 118 A political decision that balances the potential benefits -finances for development and stabilisation of financial markets -against the potential drawbacks -including increases in the prices of commodities, which might disproportionately affect the poor.
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III. Experimental taxation
Given the uncertainty attached to any predictions on the effects of taxation, Thus, taxation might not be perceived merely as a necessary evil in times of austerity but restored to its place as an essential element of a just society. 
